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Background 
Game theory has been introduced to the chemical security community in recent years. Talarico et 
al. (2015) developed the so-called ‘MISTRAL’ game for optimizing resources’ allocation in a 
multiple modal chemical transportation network. Rezazadeh et al. (2017) employed game theory 
for randomly but strategically scheduling patrolling for pipelines. Zhang and Reniers (2016) 
proposed a chemical plant protection (CPP) game based on the physical intrusion detection system 
in chemical plants. Feng et al. (2016) introduced a game theoretic approach for allocating security 
resources among multiple chemical plants within a city. These game theoretic models are 
innovative on the one hand since taking into consideration strategic adversaries, and on the other 
hand since they provide quantitative recommendations on how to allocate limited security 
resources. 
Why should game theory be introduced and used in the chemical security practitioners? 
Security risks are initiated by deliberate behaviours for certain goals. For instance, thieves 
intentionally intrude a plant for stealing valuable materials, or terrorists maliciously set a fire on a 
chemical facility to cause societal fear. Initiators of security events (henceforth, attackers) would 
intelligently observe the defender’s defence plan and then schedule their attack accordingly. 
Powell (2007) illustrated how resources can be mis-allocated if intelligent interactions between the 
defender and the attacker are not considered. Game theory was invented in the economic domain 
for modelling both the cooperative and competitive behaviours in a multiple actors system. In the 
last 100 years, game theory has been theoretically improved and practically applied to various 
domains, such as the evolutionary biology, the nuclear balance, computer science etc. These 
researches have demonstrated the capability of game theory in modelling intelligent interactions. 
Industrial managers need quantitative recommendations to support their decision making. 
Conventional security risk assessment methodologies (e.g., the API SRA framework (API, 2013)), 
being good at studying security systematically, are not able to provide quantitative insights. 
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Moreover, results of these conventional methodologies are not repeatable which means that 
applying the same methodology to the same plant, different analysts may come to different 
conclusions. Some quantitative security risk assessment models, for instance, by employing a 
Bayesian Network framework (e.g., Argenti et al. (2018); Landucci et al. (2017); Fakhravar et al. 
(2017)), can provide quantitative and repeatable results as well. Nevertheless, these models fail on 
modelling the intelligent interactions between the defender and the attacker. Game theory, 
conversely, has a rigorous mathematical foundation and models the intelligent interactions. A 
game theoretic model explicitly indicates 1) who is involved in the game; 2) what actions can each 
participant take; 3) what results (numbers) will each participant obtain, for each participants’ 
strategy combination; 4) how much information that each participant has about the game. 
Furthermore, outputs of a game theoretic model (i.e., equilibrium) clearly and quantitatively 
indicates what should the participants do (i.e., the equilibrium strategy) and what will each 
participant obtain (i.e., the equilibrium payoff).  
A critical issue is that industrial managers often prefer a qualitative approach and they have 
difficulties on understanding (the physical meaning of) the quantitative outputs of a game 
theoretical model. This issue can be addressed by requiring game developers to do a further step 
work by also translating/mapping their quantitative outputs to qualitative descriptions, and the 
latter should be expressed in terminologies that industrial practitioners are familiar with. Figure 1 
illustrates the idea. 
How can game theory be employed to improve chemical security? 
Game theory can be employed to improve chemical security from various perspectives, some of 
which have already been investigated while others still need more research input. 
From a single plant point of view, game theory can be used to study how to optimally allocate 
security resources to better defend the plant from intentional attacks. Non-cooperative games are 
most likely to be suitable in these cases. See for instance, the Chemical Plant Protection game 
proposed by Zhang and Reniers (2016), which studied how to optimally set security alert levels at 
entrances and zones of a chemical plant. 
From a cluster point of view, game theory can be used to design a better mechanism that 
stimulates security investments from each single plant. Plants in one chemical park on the one 
hand may benefit from the security investment from their neighbour plants, and on the other hand 
they may suffer a loss from an attack taking place in their neighbour plants (due the existence of 
domino effects). A good cluster-level security mechanism will stimulate plants to invest in security 
while a bad mechanism will stop plants from investing in security. Cooperative and multiple 
players games are suitable for these cases. For instance, Reniers and Soudan (2010) studied the 
security investment game within chemical industrial parks. 
Other applications of game theory in the chemical security domain can be, for instance, optimizing 
patrolling within each plant as well as in a cluster level. Furthermore, in Europe, high hazardous 
(from a safety point of view) chemical facilities are regulated by the SEVESO Directive (European 
Commission (2012)), and therefore the government and legislation have roles in the safety 
enhancement of these facilities. However, no specific regulations exists yet w.r.t to the security 
enhancement of these SEVESO sites. Game theory may play a role in the procedure of designing 
security regulations that fits benefits of different stakeholders (the chemical industries, the 
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surrounded residents, the government etc.), as well as in the auditing procedure of the compliance 
of security regulations in chemical plants.  
What obstacles are there? 
Game theory, although being invented for modelling strategic behaviours, is not widely employed 
in the chemical industrial security domain yet. Several criticisms are there. 
Game theoretic models need massive (and mostly quantitative) input data, being the first obstacle 
that prevents its popularity among industrial managers. As we mentioned before, the basic 
components of a game theoretic model are players, strategies, and payoffs. In a game against 
terrorism, the players and strategies modelling should be based on the threat and attractiveness 
analysis, for instance, to know what kind of threat the plant is facing (players modelling), and to 
know what kind of attack scenarios that the attacker may use (strategies modelling). However, 
terrorist attacks are normally happening unexpectedly in time, place, and means, as also pointed 
out by Pasman (2017) “Failing to see a possibility can be fatal, but completeness is almost 
impossible…”, and by Baybutt (2017) “The number of threat scenarios is unbounded and is 
limited only by the imagination of attackers.” Therefore, to enumerate all the possible players and 
each player’s strategies can be a difficult task. Moreover, payoffs in a game theoretic model are 
quantitative numbers, and they can be quite difficult to obtain, especially payoffs of the attackers. 
For instance, under a certain defence plan and a certain attacker intrusion path, how likely is it (a 
probability) that the attacker would successfully pass all the security barriers and reach the target? 
Furthermore, attackers may have different estimations of the probability, both with respect to the 
defender and with respect to different types of attackers. 
Game theoretic models are based on several strict assumptions, limiting the use of game theoretic 
models in industrial practice. The most frequently used assumptions are the rationality assumption 
and the common knowledge assumption. The rationality assumption requires that players are 
rational at maximizing their own payoff. In reality, human beings are not machines, and some of 
our decisions are emotions-based, especially in case of terrorists. The common knowledge 
assumption says that each player in the game knows i) its own information (i.e., rationality, 
strategies, payoffs, preferences etc.); ii) all other players’ information; iii) that other players know 
that they know other players’ information; and so forth. In reality, industrial security managers 
find it difficult to know the information even of themselves (e.g., how severe an attack would be?). 
For the information of the attackers, and also regarding whether the attackers know the defender’s 
information, the common knowledge assumption is intuitively unacceptable. 
How to remove these obstacles? 
Baybutt (2017) suggests “SVA (Security Vulnerability Analysis) practitioners to identify threat 
scenarios that are representative of unidentified scenarios?”, to meet the difficulty of completely 
enumerating all the players’ strategies. Zhang et al. (2018) propose a framework in which the API 
SRA methodology should act as the data provider while game theory should be the data processor, 
as shown in Figure 1. Zhang et al. (2017b) propose a chemical plant protection game to deal with 
inputs with distribution-free uncertainties (the Interval CPP game). The Interval CPP game does 
not need the exact numerical values of the input parameters (e.g., a probability of 0.1), instead, it 
only requires an interval that the value will be situated in (e.g., the probability is situated in the 
interval [0.05,0.2]) while how the value is distributed in the interval does not matter either. 
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Behaviour modelling has a long history of being integrated into game theoretic models. Players 
with a different rationality level (e.g., epsilon-optimal players, level-k thinking players, quantal 
response players etc.) can be modelled by different behaviour models. Zhang et al. (2017a) 
introduce a chemical plant protection game which incorporates bounded rationality attackers, for 
instance. For relaxing the common knowledge assumption, on the one hand, the so-called 
“Bayesian Game” (Harsanyi, 2004) can be employed, on the other hand, in a typical defender-
attacker sequential game (Tambe, 2011), the common knowledge assumption is actually not 
required. Furthermore, besides the “Bayesian Game” approach, a methodology called “adversarial 
risk analysis” (Rios and Insua, 2012) is also suitable for relaxing the common knowledge 
assumption in a simultaneous game. 
 
 
Figure 1. Integration of the API SRA methodology and game theory (adopted from Zhang et al. (2018)) 
Conclusions 
Game theory fills the gap that conventional security assessment methodologies are not able to deal 
with. Strategic adversaries are considered and highly quantitative recommendations can be 
provided. Research opportunities exist in the use of game theory to improve the security of 
chemical industrial activities. However, modelling challenges also exist. 
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